INTRODUCTION
Israel's withdrawal from the Gaza Strip in September 2005 ended thirtyeight years of disputed Israeli control of and presence in the territory.' Moreover, the withdrawal represented an important change in the geopolitical stability of the Middle East. 2 Israel's exit affected both Israeli citizens, many of who lived in settlements in the Gaza Strip, and Palestinians, who primarily inhabit the territory. 3 Various alleged human rights law and humanitarian law violations, mainly against Israel, arose at the same time as Israel's withdrawal plan commenced. Since it relinquished its power and control over the Gaza Strip and is subsequently no longer the governmental authority in the territory, Israel contends that it owes no legal obligations to the Palestinians in Gaza. 4 Palestinians and various non-governmental organizations contend that Israel still owes certain duties and obligations under international law despite its withdrawal. 5 Historical and religious struggles between Jews and Zionists, on one hand, and Palestinians and Arabs, on the other, date back for centuries. 6 This and "mutual defense pacts" signed by some of Israel's enemies. 30 Scholars disagree on the issue of who started the war, 3 ' but strong arguments exist that Israel was not the aggressor. Regardless, the 1967 War again pitted Egypt, 16 [Vol. 17:1 Syria, Jordan, and Iraq against Israel. 33 The acquisition of the Gaza Strip by Israel proved to be the most important result of the 1967 War. During the course of the war, Israel captured the Gaza Strip, among other territories, from Egypt. 34 Israel's acquisitions changed the geopolitical stability of the region. 35 The 1967 War resulted in Israeli control of all the land originally allocated for the Palestinians under the 1947 Partition Plan.
3 6 The war also led to the establishment of Israeli settlements in the "occupied territory" of the Gaza Strip. 37 
C. Intifada of 1987-1993
In the twenty years after the 1967 War, the Gaza Strip grew more volatile. 8 Spontaneous and uncoordinated resistance by the Palestinians quickly transformed into a rebellion-the intifada. 39 Literally translated as "shaking off," 4 the intifada began on December 8-9, 1987, two decades after Yasser Arafat called for a Palestinian revolt. 4 ' Instead of an armed rebellion, the intifada materialized into a "persistent campaign of civil resistance, with strikes and commercial shutdowns, accompanied by violent (though unarmed) demonstrations against the [Israeli] occupying forces." 42 The goals of the intifada were "to wage a holy war against the Zionist enemy, to oppose any peace efforts, and to convert the Arab states to the way of Islam and to draw them into the conflict. 4 3 The intifada represented the Palestinians' perceived "war for independence from Israel. ' 44 Palestinian nationalist aspirations for the creation of a Palestinian state drove the intifada. 45 The Palestinians' frustration grew from alleged human rights abuses 46 36 . Id. at 401-02; see Partition Plan, supra note 18, for details on the territory originally intended for the Palestinians.
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38. Emile A. Nakhleh, a Palestinian-American scholar, described the Gaza Strip as "a pressure-cooker ready to explode." TESSLER, supra note 7, at 683. 45. MORRIS, supra note 26, at 562. 46. Some of the alleged human rights abuses resulting from Israeli government policy included deportations, press censorship, denial of access to education, forced curfews, and the demolition of homes. TESSLER, supra note 7, at 677. and deplorable living conditions in the Gaza Strip. 47 A marked change in Palestinian attitude emerged during the intifada. Previously adhering to a passive resistance mentality, Palestinians now followed the concept of sumud, or steadfastness. 48 From sumud emerged a new assertiveness among the Palestinians that produced a more determined, militant, and desperate Palestinian people. 49 New pro-Palestinian organizations, notably the Unified National Leadership Uprising (UNLU) 50 and Hamas, 5 1 cast influence over Gaza. 52 Coexistent with sumud, Palestinians now perceived themselves as alone in the world and only able to rely on themselves. 53 power in the land vested primarily in the occupying Israeli military government. 57 Gaza, as a municipality, 58 was the only such kind of government in the Strip. 59 Theoretically, the municipal government derived its authority 47 . Such conditions included poverty, hatred, violence, oppression, poor sanitation, drugs, and crime. Id. at 683.
48. Id. at 684. 49. Id. at 685. 50. The UNLU emerged as an underground organization with the purpose of "guiding the evolution of the intifada." Id. at 689. The UNLU communicated by distributing leaflets, called bayanat, that were printed in secrecy at night. Id. 51. Harakat al-Muqawama al-Islamiyya (Hamas), the Islamic Resistance Movement, worked to sustain and amplify the intifada. Id. at 694. Hamas, meaning "zeal" or "ardor" in Arabic, was led in part by Dr. Abd al-Aziz al-Rantisi, a professor at Islamic University in Gaza. The Israeli municipal framework had two levels of administration: civil and military. 64 The civil administration ran agencies necessary to ensure the stability of the social infrastructure, such as departments of health, education, and transportation. 65 Israeli military influence still reached the civil administration, however, because Israeli officers, who were attached to the military, often ran these civil departments.
Id. Embedded in Hamas's ideology is the notion that
6 6 All policies devised and actions taken by the civil administration required military approval. 67 Thus, the civil administration served as an extension of Israeli military authority and had no real power or executive authority independent of the military. Before examining the conditions and allegations that arose from Israel's withdrawal from the Gaza Strip, the relevant international law must be understood.
Both international human rights law and international humanitarian law are applicable to the situation in Gaza. Various instruments and principles in these bodies of law are identified and examined below.
A. International Law
Public international law "governs relationships principally between and among sovereign states as international actors." 78 The modem day definition of international law includes other international actors, such as intergovernmental organizations and individuals, as objects and subjects of international law. 79 International human rights law and international humanitarian law are subsets of public international law.
80
There are three traditional sources of international law: (1) treaties, (2) 74 [Vol. 17:1 customary international law, and (3) general principles of law.
8 ' Additionally, equity serves as a non-traditional source of international law that tribunals often synthesize with traditional sources in settling disputes.
Treaties
The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 82 as the foremost authority on treaty law, 83 defines "treaty" as "an international agreement concluded between States in written form and governed by international law."
84
While it is possible for non-state actors to enter into treaties, 85 
Customary International Law
Customary international law, a second source of international law, 99 includes unwritten rules or principles of law that exist in the international legal arena.1°° These rules and principles become law through their widespread international acceptance as law.' 0 ' A customary international law norm binds all states unless a state has "expressly and persistently objected" to it. 0 2 While treaty-based law binds states parties based on express consent, customary international law binds states based on implicit consent. 0 3 This is an important distinction because, while treaties bind only parties, customary international law binds any international actor.'°4 Thus, customary international law projects a wider scope than treaty-based international law.
Two elements must exist for a rule or norm to rise to the level of customary international law: state practice and opiniojuris. 0 5 In other words, a state must practice the norm and follow it from a sense of legal obligation."16 Satisfaction of the state practice prong must, at the very least, show: (a) the duration of the state practice, (b) the uniform and consistent application of the practice, (c) the generality and empirical extent of the practice, and (d) the conformity of state practice to international standards. 0 7 Courts look to the widespread acceptance of international law instruments and various judicial decisions as evidence of state practice.1 0 8
Opinio juris'°9 is a "psychological element that requires an examination of a state's motives in engaging in a particular act or practice. ' ""° To satisfy this prong, a state must show that it is practicing the norm out of a sense of legal obligation, not merely convenience or coincidence."' To satisfy opinio juris, the state must show: (a) that there is a legal nature to the rule protecting 118. Jus cogens literally means "compelling law." BLACK'S LAW DIcTIONARY 876(8th ed. 2004). Jus cogens is also known as a "peremptory norm" or "peremptory rule of international law." WEISSBRODT ET AL., supra note 85, at 23. The Vienna Convention recognizes jus cogens and defines it as "a peremptory norm of general international law.., accepted and recognized by the international community of States as a whole as a norm from which no derogation is permitted and which can be modified only by a subsequent norm of general international law having the same character." Vienna Convention, supra note 84, art. 
General Principles of Law
General principles of law serve as the last traditional source of international law. 126 This source has been defined as a "non-treaty, noncustomary, and non-consensual source of international law."' 1 7
When examining international law issues, treaties and customary international law will be consulted first, and then, if gaps still need filling, general principles of law are consulted.
12 8 The rationale behind general principles of law is that "some legal principles are so general or fundamental that they are to be found in all or nearly all legal systems."' 129 If so, these principles should be used to fill in the gaps of international law.'
30
A general principle of law can also derive from "unperfected" treaties (e.g. one never entered into force) or "unperfected" customary international law (e.g. where the state practice element is not met). 140. "The modem human rights movement began during World War II." WEISSBRODT ET AL., supra note 85, at 6. "Modem day international human rights law was born in the era immediately following World War H, when pre-existing human rights norms were incorporated into positive international instruments and heralded as inviolable by the international community of nations." Edwards Affidavit, supra note 80, para. 22.3.
141. WEISSBRODTETAL., supra note 85, at 6. 142. One of the worst atrocities, the "Rape of Nanking," occurred in 1937, where the Japanese army killed at least 43,000 civilians and raped thousands of women. Id.
143. President Franklin D. Roosevelt, in his 1941 State of the Union address, outlined his "four essential human freedoms" vision of a future where human rights are ensured. Id. Winston Churchill also supported a future of human rights through the Atlantic Charter. [that are] afforded to all persons without regard for the identity of the victims or abuse perpetrators."' ' 47 International human rights law protects all persons; it "must be abided by at all times in all places by all" international actors.1 48
1.
United Nations Charter
The United Nations replaced the League of Nations as the preeminent intergovernmental world organization. 149 The Charter is the constitution of the United Nations and "is both the most prominent treaty and contains seminal human rights provisions.' 50 Initially, the United Nations Charter codified existing human rights norms and elevated them to the international level. 5 ' The Charter expressly recognizes human rights' 52 and the importance of protecting such rights among all peoples. 153 The Charter, and the rights it seeks to uphold, centers around innate human dignity.
154 Thus, the United Nations and its member states strive to promote and protect human rights.'
55
Article Fifty-Five obliges member states to promote "higher standards of living, full employment, and conditions of economic and social progress and development."'
156
Article Fifty-Six reiterates that it is an obligation of membership for states to work jointly and separately to achieve the purposes set out in Article Fifty-Five. 1 57 Any "peace-loving" state may apply for United Nations membership by submitting an application pursuant to Article Four of the Charter. 58 Next, the Security Council must recommend the applicant for admission and the General Assembly must vote to admit the state. 59 In exceptional circumstances, a state may "continue" or "succeed" another state's membership without having to submit an application and undergo the application process. 164 Membership in the United Nations' 65 obligates Israel to adhere to and promote the provisions of the Charter. Only states can become members of the United Nations;
166 the Palestinian Authority cannot become a member unless it obtains statehood. 167 Even if the Palestinian Authority obtains statehood, it would then need to be "peace-loving," submit an application, receive the recommendation of the Security Council and an affirmative vote by the General Assembly, and bind itself to the Charter.1 68 Only then could Palestine become a United Nations member and be legally bound to uphold and promote the obligations of membership contained within the Charter.
Universal Declaration of Human Rights
In 1948, the United Nations General Assembly adopted the foundation of modem international human rights law: the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR).
9
Although not a treaty, the UDHR represented a monumental human rights law achievement and served as a precursor to subsequent human rights law treaties, declarations, and other international law instruments. 70 The norms contained in the UDHR have, however, risen to the level of customary international law and are therefore binding on all international actors.' 7 ' Municipal law, such as United States case law, has recognized the norms in the UDHR as implicitly binding. 172 The UDHR also Article Three announces the most fundamental assurance of human rights, 180 while Article Seventeen follows up with property rights assurances.18' Article Twelve addresses privacy and family rights, 182 and Article Sixteen explicates on the meaning of protection of the family. 183 Article Thirteen recognizes freedom of movement. 184 The UDHR also includes provisions for economic, social, and cultural rights. Article Twenty-Two recognizes these rights generally along with the Article Twenty-Five considers standard of living, health, food, clothing, medical care, social security, and welfare. 87 Article Twenty-Six includes a provision for education,188 while Article Twenty-Seven regards cultural life. 89 The UDHR is not a treaty; it is a resolution. 190 A resolution does not legally bind a state.' 9 1 It does, however, still affect all member states of the United Nations. 92 Because the United Nations Charter spawned the UDHR and the General Assembly adopted it, Israel, by virtue of being a United Nations member state, 193 should follow the UDHR. Even so, the norms recognized within the UDHR that have risen to the level of customary international law bind Israel. 194 Conversely, the Palestinian Authority would not be obliged to comply with the UDHR in the same manner as Israel because Palestine is not a United Nations member. 1 95 But, because the norms contained within the UDHR have risen to the level of customary international law,' 96 these norms would still bind the Palestinian Authority as an international actor. 219 assured skeptics that, despite the somewhat loose language of Article Two, a state party must take steps "within a reasonably short time" after the ICESCR enters into force. 220 Therefore, the burden rests on the state party to prove it is "taking steps" to implement the ICESCR and is making progress. 22 ' The ICESCR expressly recognizes the UDHR and seeks to adhere to its 
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ideals. 222 The ICESCR focuses on the individual's duties to others and the community. 223 
Palestinian Authority, a non-state, 272 is not and presently cannot be a state party to the ICCPR; however, the norms contained within the ICCPR have risen to customary international law. 273 Those norms implicitly bind the Palestinian Authority as an international actor. 274 
Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement
The United Nations first raised awareness of the international crisis of internal displacement.2 In 1992, the Secretary-General of the United Nations appointed Mr. Francis M. Deng as the representative on internally displaced persons. 276 Mr. Deng studied the causes and consequences of internal displacement and the status of internally displaced persons within an international law context. 277 At the time of his report, Mr. Deng found that internal displacement affected about twenty-five million people worldwide and often involved the gross violation of human rights. 27 8 Mr. Deng focused his mandate on developing normative and institutional frameworks to assist in the plight of internally displaced persons and to promote a systematic international response. 27 9 In 1996, Deng submitted a "Compilation and Analysis of Legal Norms ' 28° to the Commission on Human Rights. 28 5, 1995) .
281. The Commission on Human Rights is a key charter-based United Nations body pertaining to the protection of human rights. WEISSBRODT Er AL., supra note 85, at 15. The Commission can "initiate studies and fact-finding missions, draft conventions and declarations for approval by higher bodies, discuss specific human rights violations in public or private sessions, and initiate suggestions for improving the U.N.'s human rights procedures." Id. The Commission can also establish rapporteurs, consider specific state situations confidentially, and use thematic procedures to review certain alleged human rights violations. Id.
282. Guiding Principles, supra note 277, 1 7.
[Vol. 17:1 Principles). 8 3 The Guiding Principles "address[es] the specific needs of internally displaced persons worldwide by identifying rights and guarantees relevant to their protection. '' 8 International human rights law and international humanitarian law serve as the backbone of the Guiding Principles. 2 85 The Guiding Principles incorporates treaty-based international law and customary international law. 286 Specifically, the Guiding Principles "address[es] gaps identified in the Compilation and Analysis," such as the different phases of displacement, protection against arbitrary displacement, and government and 287 institutional assistance during displacement.
In this regard, the Guiding
288.ats
Principles, albeit soft law, is intended to act similarly to general principles of law as a gap-filler. 289 The Guiding Principles provides guidance to states, internally displaced persons, and other authorities and institutions, such as the United Nations. 29 0
Deng intended the Guiding Principles to be persuasive authority that aids states in determining the best course of action regarding internally displaced persons and their rights. 29 ' Additionally, the Guiding Principles was to serve as an educational and consciousness-raising tool. 2 92 Deng also hoped the Guiding Principles would ultimately help prevent crises of internal displacement. 293 The Guiding Principles defines "internally displaced persons": 301. Id. principle 5. "All authorities and international actors shall respect and ensure respect for their obligations under international law, including human rights and humanitarian law, in all circumstances, so as to prevent and avoid conditions that might lead to displacement of persons." Id.
302. Id. principle 6, 1. 303. Id. principle 6, 1 2. These circumstances include displacement based on "(a) apartheid, 'ethnic cleansing' or similar practices"; (b) "situations of armed conflict"; (c) "cases of large-scale development projects, which are not justified by compelling and overriding public interests"; (d) "cases of disasters, unless the safety and health of those affected requires evacuation"; and (e) "collective punishment." Id.
304. Id. principle 7, 1. 305. Id. principle 7, 1 2. "The authorities undertaking such displacement shall ensure, to the greatest practicable extent, that proper accommodation is provided to the displaced persons.
[Vol. 17:1 A MODERN DAY EXODUS families are kept together "to the greatest practicable extent" when displaced.°6 When displacement does not result from the most compelling stages of armed conflict and natural disasters, certain guarantees apply to the displaced. 30 7 These guarantees include an undertaking to inform the displaced of the reasons and procedures for their displacement, compensation, if applicable, the right to effective legal remedy, and an undertaking to involve the displaced persons in the decision-making process of the relocation. 30 8 Principle Eight recognizes that displacement shall be carried out in a humane manner. 3 9 Principle Nine informs states that they are under a particular obligation to protect against the displacement of certain classes of peoples. 31 0 Principle Ten recognizes the inherent right to life and prohibits violence against internally displaced persons. 3 1 Principles Eleven and Seventeen remind international actors that every human has the right to dignity. 31 2 Principle Twelve prohibits arbitrary arrest. 313 Principle Thirteen prohibits the involvement of children in hostilities. 314 Principle Fourteen recognizes the freedom of movement of internally displaced persons. 31 5 Principle Fifteen expounds upon Principle Fourteen by recognizing that internally displaced persons have the right to seek safety or asylum elsewhere and to be protected from "forcible return to or resettlement in any place where their life, safety, liberty and/or health would be at risk., 3 16 Principle Sixteen recognizes the right to information on missing internally displaced persons and asks for the cooperation of relevant international organizations in assisting governmental authorities in providing such information. 317 Principle Seventeen reiterates the right to life, further expanding the definition by including the right of family members to stay together during times of internal displacement. 31 
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clothing, and medical services.
19
Principle Twenty announces that everyone "has the right to recognition everywhere as a person before the law." 320 Accordingly, authorities shall issue identifying documents to internally displaced persons when appropriate.
321
Principle Twenty-One prohibits the arbitrary deprivation of property and possessions. 322 Principle Twenty-Two allows the internally displaced the opportunity to seek work. 323 Principle Twenty-Three recognizes the right to 324 education, although authorities are only obligated to provide compulsory primary education to internally displaced persons. 325 Principles Twenty-Four 326 through Twenty-Seven regard humanitarian assistance. 3 6 Finally, Principles Twenty-Eight through Thirty contain rights of return and resettlement for the internally displaced in addition to obligations for authorities.
327
Many of the Principles align with provisions of the UDHR, ICESCR, ICCPR, and the norms recognized in these instruments. These instruments all seek to uphold human dignity. 328 All of these instruments contain provisions prohibiting discrimination 329 and recognize rights associated with the family.
330
The UDHR, ICCPR, and Guiding Principles expressly recognize the inherent right to life. 33 1 While the ICESCR does not expressly recognize the right to life, it must recognize it implicitly; one cannot enjoy economic, social, and cultural rights without being alive. The UDHR, ICESCR, and Guiding Principles recognize the right to education. 332 These instruments also all recognize the right to work 333 From the numerous connections identified above, it becomes evident that these human rights instruments complement one another in the recognition and guarantee of human rights through international law. At the very least, they provide supplementary support to that idea.
C. International Humanitarian Law-Applicable Sources and Instruments
International humanitarian law, 336 another subset of public international law, operates specifically in situations of armed conflict. 337 This body of law applies to state and non-state actors 3 38 and is based on treaties and customary international law. 339 International humanitarian law "recognizes a sense of humanity in armed conflict," and "places limits on the means and method of conducting war." 34° In this regard, international humanitarian law can be characterized as an "intersection of human rights law with the law of war."
34 '
The rules of international humanitarian law protect civilians and persons not involved or no longer involved in combat. 342 Unlike international human rights law, which always applies and protects all human beings no matter the situation, 34 3 international humanitarian law applies only during armed conflict 344 and protects only those involved in armed conflict. 345 International humanitarian law is situation-and context-specific in its applicability. 346 Therefore, the scope and applicability of international humanitarian law is necessarily narrower than that of international human rights law.
The Geneva Conventions
The Geneva Conventions serve as the principal instruments governing international humanitarian law. 34 7 Specifically, the Fourth Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War 3 48 pertains to the 336. International humanitarian law is also known as "IHL" or the "law of armed conflict" or "LOAC" or the "law of war." Edwards Affidavit, supra note 80, para. 
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situation in the Gaza Strip because the territory has been, and still may be, 349 an "occupied territory., 350 The Fourth Geneva Convention is an international treaty; 351 however, many of the rules and norms contained within the Fourth Geneva Convention are widely accepted as customary international law. 352 Therefore, all international actors are implicitly bound to follow those rules and norms during armed conflict or occupation. 35 3 Many articles in the Fourth Geneva Convention are relevant to the situation in the Gaza Strip. Article Four defines the category of persons protected as "those who, at a given moment and in any manner whatsoever, find themselves, in case of conflict or occupation, in the hands of a Party to the conflict or Occupying Power of which they are not nationals. 3 54 Article Twenty-Five provides for information to be forwarded regarding the status of family members, 355 while Article Twenty-Six includes the right to reunite with dispersed family members. 356 Article Thirty-Three prohibits using "measures of intimidation or of terrorism.
' 357 Article Thirty-Four prohibits taking of hostages without distinguishing between civilian and combatant hostages. Humanitarian law applies to internally displaced persons when such persons are in a state where armed conflict or occupation is occurring. 36° In such a case, internally displaced persons are considered "civilians" under 352. WEISSBRODT Israel is a state party to the Fourth Geneva Convention. 362 The Palestinian Authority, a non-state, is not and presently cannot be a state party. 363 But, since international humanitarian law and the Fourth Geneva Convention exist as customary international law, the Palestinian Authority is implicitly bound to follow and respect such rules and norms during armed conflict or 364 occupation.
First Additional Protocol to the Geneva Conventions
The First Additional Protocol to the Geneva Conventions (First Protocol) 3 65 provides additional protection to victims of international armed conflicts. 366 Articles Forty-Eight through Fifty-Six deal specifically with protection of civilians and civilian objects. 367 Article Forty-Eight provides basic rules for protection of civilian populations and objects. 368 Article FortyNine defines "attacks" as "acts of violence against the adversary, whether in offence or in defence., 369 Article Fifty defines "civilians" and "civilian population." 370 This article provides latitude on who qualifies as a civilian. 37 '
Article Fifty-One sets the rules of protection for civilians. 372 Specifically, civilians "shall not be the object of attack. ' The following day, the IDF completed the evacuation pursuant to the disengagement plan.
4 W This marked the culmination of official Israeli military control in the Gaza Strip, ending thirty-eight years of Israeli military presence. 4°1 Overall, Israel forced out about 8000 of its citizens at a cost of approximately $1.8 billion.
2
The Israeli government and the IDF encountered protest and resistance by Israeli settlers who were subsequently removed. 4 3 The IDF also reported attacks by Palestinians during the withdrawal. 4°4 As a whole, the disengagement plan proceeded relatively peacefully;
4°5 however, postwithdrawal violence has occurred in the Gaza Strip between Israel and the Palestinians. 4 0 6 Also, the relocated Israelis have faced inferior housing, difficulty in finding comparable employment, and fractured communities. 4°I srael claims it is free of any legal obligation pertaining to the Gaza Strip or the Palestinians living or located there. 4°8 In contrast, the Palestinian Authority and Human Rights Watch, a non-governmental human rights organization, among others, assert that Israel's international legal obligations did not extinguish upon its withdrawal. 4°9 Thus, various international human rights law and international humanitarian law claims have arisen since Israel's withdrawal from the Gaza Strip.
A. Denial of Access to Education, Freedom of Movement, and Family Rights
Mohamed Anwar Qawash, a twenty year-old Palestinian, was studying medicine in Egypt prior to Israel's withdrawal from the Gaza Strip. 410 After the Israeli disengagement plan commenced, the IDF permitted Bilal's family to return home, but the LDF required Bilal to stay. 41 4 The reason for the distinction is unknown. Bilal remained with a brother in the Gaza Strip, but apart from the rest of his family, friends, home, and school in Qatar. 4 15 It is unknown whether Bilal has been allowed to return to Qatar.
The Palestinian Centre for Human Rights (PCHR) argues that Mohamed and Bilal's cases represent a deprivation of the right to continue education. 416 In addition, they are potentially deprivations of the right to freedom of movement, family rights, and, specifically to Bilal, a violation of special children's rights. Other restrictions on movement have been reported by PCHR.
4 17 Assuming the stories of Mohamed and Bilal are true, Israel may be in breach of Articles Ten and Thirteen of the ICESCR 4 18 and Articles Twelve, Seventeen, and Twenty-Four of the ICCPR. 419 Israel may also have violated the customary international law norms recognized within Articles Twelve, Sixteen, and Twenty-Six of the UDHR.
PCHR argues that, despite the withdrawal of Israel, the Gaza Strip is still "occupied"; therefore, international humanitarian law should still apply. 420 Presupposing that the Gaza Strip still constitutes an occupied territory, Israel may have also breached Article Twenty-Six of the Fourth Geneva Convention. 421 According to PCHR, Israel continues to reject the applicability of the ICESCR, ICCPR, and Fourth Geneva Convention to the situation in the Gaza Strip and to those Palestinians affected. 422 Israel, as a state party to the ICESCR, ICCPR, and Fourth Geneva Convention, has an international legal duty to follow the provisions of these treaties and not to take steps that Therefore, an advisory opinion, rather than an adversary decision, was the only feasible way for the issue to reach the ICJ. The ICJ advised that the construction of a security wall or annexation wall 429 by Israel violated the right of freedom of movement and was an international human rights law and international humanitarian law violation. 43°T he ICJ further advised that the construction of the wall went so far as to violate the Palestinians' right to self-determination. 431 The ICJ informed Israel that it is obligated to halt the construction of the wall, demolish portions of the wall already erected, and cease to impede the movement of any persons. 43 2 According to the ICJ, failure to comply would amount to an internationally wrongful act.
433
The ICJ also included in its advisory opinion that all legislation and regulations associated with the construction of the wall must be repealed. 4 34 Further, the ICJ recognized Israel's obligation to make reparations. 435 The ICJ adopted and articulated the customary international law definition of reparation: "[A] reparation must, as far as possible, wipe out all the consequences of the illegal act and reestablish the situation which would, in all The ICJ anticipated that if restitution was materially impossible, then Israel owes compensation to persons damaged as a result of the construction of the wall. 438 PCHR alleges that the construction and operation of the wall violates the rights recognized in Articles Seventeen, Twenty-Three, Twenty-Five, TwentySix, and Twenty-Seven of the UDHR. 439 While Israel certainly has the right to self defense under international human rights law"4 0 and international humanitarian law, 44 it cannot implement defense measures that violate international law.
B. Denial of the Right to Work
PCHR authored a response to the Israeli disengagement plan. In its response, PCHR alleged that Israel was denying Palestinians' access to work by closing the Rafah border" 2 and Erez Military Checkpoint."4 3 PCHR also alleged that Israel intended to end all access for Palestinian workers by 2 00 8 . 444 The Gaza Strip is largely isolated; therefore, Palestinians rely on the right of freedom of movement to find work. 445 PCHR asserts that the Israeli disengagement plan, which includes measures for restriction of access to work, will ultimately result in severe economic loss to the Palestinians.
duties. 450 
C. Demolition of Housing and the Right to an Adequate Standard of Living
Part of the Israeli disengagement plan included demolishing the homes of former Israeli settlers in the Gaza Strip. 451 Israel coordinated this decision with the Palestinian Authority. 452 The report does not indicate that Israel destroyed any personal property of the former Israeli settlers, just the former residences. 4 53 Israel, as a state party to the ICESCR, has the duty to recognize the right to an adequate standard of living, which includes housing, for all persons. 5 4 As part of its obligations as a state party, Israel must refrain from doing anything to defeat the object and purpose of Article Eleven or the ICESCR generally. 4 55 Also, the norms recognized within Article Twenty-Five of the UDHR are included as part of Israel's international legal obligations under customary international law. 456 Since the norms articulated in the provisions of the ICESCR have arguably risen to customary international law status, the Palestinian Authority also has the duty to recognize the right to an adequate standard of living. 457 Therefore, Israel and the Palestinian Authority's participation in the destruction of housing readily available for Palestinians may be in contravention of this norm.
D. Forced Removal, Forced Eviction, and Internal Displacement
The Israeli disengagement plan resulted in the forced removal and relocation of approximately 8000 Israelis living in the Gaza Strip. 458 These "Resettlers" were forcibly relocated, but remained within the territory of Israel rather than "cross[ing] an internationally recognized State border. 459 Accordingly, the Resettlers fit the definition for internally displaced persons under the Guiding Principles. Thus, at first glance the Guiding Principles seems to apply to the Resettlers' rights.
A key question is whether the displacement of the Resettlers is "arbitrary." Principle Six of the Guiding Principles prohibits arbitrary displacement and articulates particular scenarios that are arbitrary.4 6 0 These scenarios include displacement based: on apartheid, ethnic cleansing, or similar practices; on situations of armed conflict where security reasons do not dictate displacement; on large-scale development projects that are not justifiably compelling and override public interest; on disasters that do not require evacuation based on public safety and health; and on displacement used as collective punishment. 46 1 In this instance, none of the proffered scenarios fit the Resettlers' situation. Israel's decision to withdraw from the Gaza Strip, which displaced its citizens, seemed to stem from politics rather than a legal sensea62-a category not included among arbitrary displacement. Although Principle Six does not include all possible examples of arbitrary displacement, the resultant displacement of the Resettlers does not seem to contravene the prohibition in Principle Six. 463 Under Principle Seven of the Guiding Principles, Israel must "ensure, to the greatest practicable extent, that proper accommodation is provided to the [Resettlers] . ' 4 4 Israel provided the Resettlers with a choice of four compensation plans: (1) Resettlers who lived in the settlements for more than four years are "entitled to a replacement house of similar quality"; (2) Resettlers who lived in the settlements for less than four years or lived elsewhere during that time period are entitled to compensation based on their property value; (3) any Resettler can be relocated in an area chosen by the Israeli government; and (4) any Resettler that chooses to relocate in an area not chosen by the Israeli government is entitled to some compensation on a case-by-case basis. 465 One troubling aspect of the Resettlers' displacement is the "free and informed consent" guarantee of Principle Seven. 466 Since the displacement did not occur during an emergency, armed conflict, or natural disaster, Principle Seven guarantees that "free and informed consent of those to be displaced shall be sought." 467 While it seems the Resettlers were informed of the displacement many months in advance, it does not appear their consent was sought.
The Guiding Principles is soft law and not binding upon Israel. 468 It does, though, mirror many of the norms of binding international human rights law. 469 Israel, as a United Nations member, carries the obligation to reaffirm and promote human dignity. 470 Therefore, it would behoove the Israeli government to consider the Guiding Principles in the context of the internal displacement of its own citizens. An Israeli high court even ruled in line with the Guiding Principles and against an Israeli military order that would forcibly relocate three individuals from the West Bank to the Gaza Strip. 47 person and restriction on freedom of movement.
It also resulted in a humanitarian law violation. 479 The Palestinian militants, as individuals in the international legal system, are accountable for these violations. Individuals are subjects of international law. 480 Thus, individuals owe duties as international actors and must uphold international legal obligations. 48 ' Also, these violations could be imputed to the Palestinian Authority via Hamas. Because Hamas rose to power as the controlling party of the Palestinian Authority, it too, as an international actor, could be attributed to this violation. 4 82
F. Destruction of Civilian Objects, Indiscriminate Attacks, and Measures of Intimidation
Israel responded to the kidnapping of Shalit by destroying a power station in the Gaza Strip. 483 A few days later, Palestinian militants fired two Qassam rockets from the Gaza Strip into a nearby Israeli town. 84 These rockets, bearing the name of Hamas's military wing, were unguided and were fired indiscriminately into Israeli civilian populations. 48 5 Reportedly, Israel then intimidated the Palestinians in Gaza by creating sonic booms with its fighter 486 jets.
If the Gaza power station was not sustaining or directly supporting the Palestinian militants, then its destruction resulted in a humanitarian law violation. 8 7 Further, a power station probably qualifies as an "object[] indispensable to the survival of the civilian population," and thus added to the severity of the act. 488 Also, creating sonic booms to instill fear in a civilian population is prohibited. 8 9
The firing of Qassam rockets into Israeli civilian populations resulted in a humanitarian law violation by the Palestinian militants a . 4 9 The rockets were unguided and clearly aimed at civilian targets, as there were no Israeli military targets in the vicinity. a9 ' Also, since the Qassam rocket attacks apparently were launched in retaliation, this constitutes another humanitarian law violation.
CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Ultimately, both Israel and the Palestinian Authority are bound by international law to ensure that human rights are recognized and protected for all persons in the Gaza Strip. Israel is further obligated to ensure the rights of those affected by its withdrawal from the Gaza Strip. Israel, bound by conventional and customary international law, continues to owe duties to the Palestinians in the Gaza Strip and to its own citizens who were internally displaced as a result of the withdrawal.
Failing to recognize international legal obligations to the Palestinians in Gaza would be contrary to the object and purpose of the various international human rights law treaties to which Israel is a state party. Also, Israel should follow the Guiding Principles pertaining to Israeli citizens that were internally displaced because of the disengagement plan. These Resettlers fit the definition of internally displaced persons under the Guiding Principles. The Guiding Principles follows the spirit of international human rights law; Israel, as a United Nations member, has an obligation to promote this spirit.
The Palestinian Authority, as an international actor, owes duties to the Israelis and Palestinians under customary international law. Failing to recognize its international obligations would be in direct opposition to the widely accepted customary international law norms and principles that exist in the international realm. Furthermore, as the Palestinian Authority is propositioning the world for statehood, recognizing and ensuring its duties under customary international law serves the interest of all Palestinians seeking their own state. By doing so, the Palestinian Authority can demonstrate to the international community that its intentions are good and that it has the capacity to meet state responsibilities-strong support for Palestinian statehood.
Reports of alleged human rights violations in the Gaza Strip warrant further inquiry. While some nongovernmental organizations, such as Human Rights Watch, have undertaken studies and fact-finding missions, the United Nations is best suited to conduct a thorough examination of these allegations. Many options exist, such as the dispatch of a Special Rapporteur or an investigation by the Human Rights Commission or a human rights expert. 493 Alternatively, the General Assembly or Security Council could invoke the ICJ's advisory jurisdiction, like in the Israeli Wall case, 494 to determine the legal obligations of Israel pertaining to its withdrawal from the Gaza Strip. However, this request would most likely need to arise from the General Assembly rather than the Security Council. The United States is a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council, 495 and, as an ally of Israel, would likely veto any such request for ICJ advisory jurisdiction originating in the Security Council. Issues of enforcing human rights are a perennial concern. If human rights violations have occurred or are still occurring in the Gaza Strip, international legal institutions and mechanisms are in place to provide recourse. Lack of enforcement in the past or a sense that international human rights law is merely aspirational is not a compelling reason to fail to investigate alleged violations, and, if appropriate, enforce international law.
Israel and the Palestinian Authority each have international legal obligations. Both are in a position to work together to ensure international human rights law is upheld, setting a firm foundation for a new beginning in the Gaza Strip and a new age in the Middle East.
